A COALITION STRUCTURE DYNAMICS AND GAME IMPORTANCE

E. R. Domilovsky
Vant. Ser. Metodiki i Programmy Chislennogo Resheniya Zadach Matematicheskoy Fiziki 1983. Вып.2. С. 19-20.

      The paper considers a finite cooperative game coalition structure defined by a fixed coalition pair merging probability, K(q,n), for a time unit, one of them containing g and the other i players and also by a q+n coalition separation probability, L(q,n), for a time unit, g and n being the number of players in each pair. It is shown that for К and L related by and for associated ergodic Markov process the limiting contribution of an i-player to his coalition when averaged over a stationary measure on a coalition structure set coincides with the Shapley vector i-component.